In Parashat Kedoshim, the Torah repeats the prohibition against taking revenge in a manner that appears to be redundant. The two words that are used – nekimah and netirah – seem like synonyms. The assumption of the rabbinic sages, however, is that the Torah is not using poetic language and parallel words simply for literary style; these repetitious sounding words must have significance. Believing that there must be two separate prohibitions here, the sages offer a close reading of this verse, concluding that nekimah and netirah relate to two different – but related – prohibitions.

 

The midrash explains that nekimah – revenge – relates to the refusal of a friendly act as revenge for a being refused a similar request:

Revenge is illustrated by the following example: One said to his fellow: Lend me your sickle, and he said: No. The next day he – the one who had refused to lend the sickle – said to the other person: Lend me your ax. If he said to him: I will not lend to you, just as you did not lend to me, that is revenge (Bavli Yoma 23a).

 

This is “sweet revenge.” There is a prohibition against facing another who refused you in the past but who is now in need and refusing to help him.

 

The midrash continues by explaining that netirah – bearing a grudge – is when you overcome the desire for revenge and respond positively to the request, but only after reminding borrower that when the situation was the other way around, he was not willing to help out. It is because of your great generosity that you have overcome the feelings of exacting revenge, but it is because you are so magnanimous, not because he is deserving of it:

And what is bearing a grudge? If one said to his fellow: Lend me your ax, and he said: No, and the next day he – the one who had refused to lend the ax – said to the other man: Lend me your robe; if the first one said to him: Here it is, as I am not like you, who would not lend to me, that is bearing a grudge. 

 

It is reasonable to suggest that nekimah is an act – albeit, an act of omission – while netirah is speech, as it relates to the words and ideas that are expressed. It appears that the midrash chose to describe these laws by means of a narrative, since it wants to present us with stories that will help us understand the human element in the interaction. The sin lies in a mistaken encounter between the two individuals. It lies in the depths of the deed and not in the act itself. It lies in the meaning of the words and not in the words themselves.

 

The stories clarify the conclusion that even though from the perspective of the borrower, nekimah (where he does not get the desired object) is worse than netirah (where he gets what he needs, together with a tongue-lashing), on a human level it is the opposite. The personal offence and mental anguish caused by netirah is much worse than that of nekimah.

 

The reciprocity of netirah – revenge – offers some balance. The victim now knows in his heart that the offender is no better than him – after all, he also failed when faced with a similar situation. He gets to save full use of the object for himself, even as the bitter taste of keeping it for himself remains. Even the good deed of the person who bears a grudge – the noteir – however, is done by means of exacting revenge. His act of kindness is accompanied by a statement declaring himself better than his fellow, and the lack of reciprocity makes the offence even worse.

 

The Hizkuni asks about someone who does not lend his possessions to others, simply because of selfishness. The Torah does not appear to take any position on this, even though most cases where one person refuses to help another do not stem from bad relationships, quarrels or a bitter memories.

 

The Hizkuni suggests:

One can say that the first person refuses to lend simply because of selfishness – as his ax was too precious in his eyes

And the Holy One Blessed be He does not obligate anyone to lend things when they do not want to.

But this one – who would have been willing to lend it were it not for his hateful need for revenge – is choosing not to lend because of his hatred.

This is why the Holy One Blessed be He commands that the love overcome the hatred, so that this will bring peace to the world.

 

According to the Hizkuni there is no obligation to lend things. The rights of ownership remain, even if a selfish person may take advantage of them in an inappropriate manner – and certainly if the selfishness is the result of the owner’s concern that the object that he is asked to lend may become broken or ruined. It may be legitimate to ignore the needs of others according to the Hizkuni. Revenge and bearing a grudge, however, are illegitimate. No one is obligated to do favors for others, but there is a Torah prohibition that forbids the creation of a cycle of hate. And there is an obligation to avoid creating a feeling of inferiority and moral superiority that causes a person to hate himself.

 

Thus, even according to the Hizkuni, the point of these prohibitions is not the practical outcome, but the inner essence – on the encounter itself and the creation of cognitive distance. That is where the prohibition is imposed with full force.

 

The Shela”h haKadosh goes further in writing:

Netirah – is in the heart of the individual who bears a grudge; even though he does share the object, he does not forget what was done to him.

Nekimah – is where he refuses to lend, just as his fellow refused to lend.

                        (Tokhahat Mussar)

According to the Shela”h, netirah is prohibited even if the lender says nothing when he lends the object, but he remembers what happened and compliments himself silently on being better than his friend – if he remembers and does not forgive.

 

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The verse concludes by stating that these prohibitions are in force when they are directed “against your countrymen,” continuing with the command: “Love your fellow as yourself.” The prohibitions against nekimah and netirah do not apply to the nations of the world, since these are not normative prohibitions that apply to all humankind. In fact, the opposite would seem to be true. We would anticipate that justice requires appropriate reward and punishment.

 

There is no obligation to seek out revenge against non-Jews, but it is certainly permissible to remember and not to forget. The prohibition against taking revenge or holding a grudge “against your countrymen,” strives to create brotherhood and solidarity, beyond fairness and justice. It is our goal to love and we prefer to love. Not because we live in a world that overflows with tenderness and compassion, but because love is good.